Annexes A–C — Starting Now

Annexes

Annex A — Comparative Institutional Timeline

The table below summarises the comparative institutional development of Ukrainian and United Kingdom defence-technology architectures, with proposed UK development against a notional commencement in April 2026. Ukrainian dates are historical; UK dates are projected and assume the recommendations in Section 8 are adopted.

Year	United Kingdom (proposed)	Ukraine (historical)
2018	—	Trembita launched; X-Road adopted from Estonia.
2019	—	Ministry of Digital Transformation established under Fedorov.
2020	—	Diia launched as citizen-services application.
2022	—	Full-scale invasion; Army of Drones launched (June).
2023	—	Brave1 established (April); DELTA formally commissioned (February).
2024	Project ASGARD announced and contracted.	DOT-Chain Defence launched; DELTA rolled out across Armed Forces (August); defence-tech investment £5m.
2025	SDR published (June); Defence Industrial Strategy (September); Defence Investment Plan delayed.	180 brigades on DOT-Chain; 3m+ strike drones delivered; defence-tech investment £80m; UNITE-Brave NATO launched.
2026	Proposed: political commitment; Defence Technology Cluster incorporated; first marketplace contracts; DELTA MoU negotiated.	Fedorov becomes Defence Minister (14 January); Gulf security partnerships signed (March).
2027	Proposed: Cluster at 100 staff; first marketplace category at scale; DELTA licensing agreed.	(Projected) Further export agreements; European integration.
2028	Proposed: foundation layer v1.0 delivered; three marketplace categories operational; DELTA UK pilot.	(Projected) Industry consolidation.
2029	Proposed: brigade-level end-user selection operational across British Army; Cluster at 300 staff.	(Projected) Mature export profile.
2031	Proposed: architecture at scale; UK position restored relative to European peers.	(Projected) Continued leadership.

The United Kingdom begins from behind and cannot close the gap without architectural action — but the gap is closable through the proposed architecture over a five-year horizon.

Annex B — Ukrainian Institutional Components

Reference summary for readers who have not followed the detail elsewhere.

Trembita

Interoperability platform for Ukrainian state registries, launched 2018 on the basis of the Estonian X-Road system with EU support. Connects 150+ state registries; 14 billion data exchanges processed as of mid-2025. Federated architecture: each registry retains its own database; Trembita provides the cryptographic authentication and data-exchange protocol.

Diia

Citizen-facing mobile application and web portal for Ukrainian government services, launched 2020. 22+ million users. 140+ services available. Sits on top of Trembita. Source code partially open-sourced in 2024.

Prozorro

Public procurement platform built 2014–2016 as post-Maidan anti-corruption reform. All tenders, bids, and contracts are public by default. Handles all state procurement including defence procurement framework agreements.

Brave1

Defence-technology cluster established April 2023, jointly by Ministries of Digital Transformation, Defence, Strategic Industries, and Economy, the General Staff, and the National Security and Defence Council. Functions: grant-making, certification, marketplace operation, investment matchmaking. £30m+ annual budget. 50 startups raised $105m+ in 2025 across the ecosystem.

DELTA

Battle management system built since 2016 by military unit A2724 and the Centre of Innovations and Defence Technologies Development. Cloud-native, modular, NATO-standards-compliant. Passed NATO-grade information security audit July 2024. Modules: Deltamonitor (common operational picture), Target Hub (fire coordination), Vezha (drone video analysis), Mission Control (UAV crew coordination), Secure Chat (encrypted comms), Monitor Mobile (smartphone client). In export negotiation with at least one NATO country.

DOT-Chain Defence

Defence procurement marketplace operated by the Defence Procurement Agency. 180+ brigades and 2 National Guard corps as buyers. 80+ drone manufacturers, 400+ UAV types available. Integration with DELTA (verification) and Brave1 Market (catalogue). Operates on framework agreements through Prozorro for audit transparency.

Army of Drones Bonus

Integrated procurement mechanism linking battlefield effectiveness to resource allocation. Soldiers upload kill evidence to DELTA; verified kills generate points; points spent in Brave1 Market; fulfilment through DOT-Chain Defence by the Defence Procurement Agency. Effect: procurement volumes track operational performance automatically.

Ministry of Digital Transformation

Ukrainian government ministry established 2019 under Mykhailo Fedorov. Operating culture of product-delivery rather than policy-drafting. Staffed largely from private IT sector. Responsible for Diia, Trembita integration, Army of Drones (initial programme), and the institutional template for Brave1 and DOT-Chain Defence. Fedorov became Minister of Defence on 14 January 2026, importing the Ministry's operating model into the MoD itself.

Defence Procurement Agency

Ukrainian MoD agency reformed under Arsen Zhumadilov. Operates framework agreements on Prozorro based on tactical-technical specifications rather than named products. Operates DOT-Chain Defence marketplace. Supplied 1m+ FPV drones in H1 2025 alone, contracted 2m+ for the year, 3m+ strike drones across all channels by end-2025.

Annex C — Suggested Questions for Ministers

Indicative texts for Members wishing to press the issues raised in this paper through the mechanisms of the House. Grouped by intended recipient and by the specific point each is designed to probe. Texts are starting drafts; Members will wish to adapt them to current parliamentary language and their own emphasis.

C.1 Defence Investment Plan — Publication and Architecture

To ask the Secretary of State for Defence, when the Defence Investment Plan originally scheduled for autumn 2025 will be published; what assessment has been made of the capability implications of its continued delay; and whether the plan, when published, will reflect the architectural principles identified in the Strategic Defence Review as necessary for wartime-pace innovation.

To ask the Secretary of State for Defence, what assessment he has made of the institutional architecture required to deliver the sixty-two recommendations of the Strategic Defence Review 2025; and whether the Defence Investment Plan will set out specifically the architectural carve-outs required for marketplace-pattern procurement of drone and autonomous systems.

C.2 UK Defence Innovation — Scale and Scope

To ask the Secretary of State for Defence, whether he considers the £400 million envelope of UK Defence Innovation adequate to deliver the Review's ambition of innovation at wartime pace; and what assessment has been made of the scale at which equivalent Ukrainian and European defence-technology clusters operate.

To ask the Secretary of State for Defence, what terms and conditions apply to staff of UK Defence Innovation; whether those terms are benchmarked to comparable private-sector technology roles; and whether he will make a statement on the recruitment strategy required to compete with Helsing, Anduril, and equivalent defence-technology firms for talent.

C.3 Project ASGARD — Generalisation

To ask the Secretary of State for Defence, whether the operating model employed for Project ASGARD — described by the Ministry of Defence as having progressed "at an unprecedented pace" with contracts awarded within three months of announcement — will be generalised across other defence procurement categories; and what specific programmes have been identified for similar treatment in the Defence Investment Plan.

To ask the Secretary of State for Defence, what lessons have been drawn from the contrasting delivery timelines of Project ASGARD (announcement to operational prototype in seven months) and the Watchkeeper programme (announcement to operational capability exceeding a decade); and what institutional changes are required to make the ASGARD timeline typical rather than exceptional.

C.4 Ukrainian Technology Partnership

To ask the Secretary of State for Defence, what discussions he has had with his Ukrainian counterpart on the licensing of the DELTA battlespace management system, following reports that at least one NATO country is in active negotiation for its acquisition; and whether the United Kingdom is party to, or has been invited to join, the UNITE – Brave NATO joint programme launched in November 2025.

To ask the Secretary of State for Defence, what assessment has been made of the Ukrainian DOT-Chain Defence procurement marketplace, through which 180 brigades select drones and related equipment directly from certified manufacturers; and whether a comparable mechanism could be established under the Procurement Act 2023 for the British Army.

C.5 Defence Technology Cluster — Institutional Form

To ask the Secretary of State for Defence, whether he has considered the establishment of a statutory defence-technology cluster, along the lines of the Ukrainian Brave1, as an arms-length body outside standard civil service terms and conditions; and what assessment has been made of the Government Digital Service model (2011–2015) as a precedent for institutional design within British government.

To ask the Chancellor of the Exchequer, what assessment has been made of the Green Book and Orange Book framework as applied to defence-technology cluster investment; and whether a distinct risk tolerance framework, of the kind applied to the British Business Bank and the National Security Strategic Investment Fund, would be appropriate for defence-technology grant-making and equity investment.

C.6 Parliamentary Oversight

To ask the Secretary of State for Defence, what arrangements are being made to co-develop parliamentary oversight instruments for marketplace-pattern procurement; and whether the Defence Committee, the Public Accounts Committee, and the National Audit Office have been engaged on the design of those instruments ahead of any architectural reform.

To ask the Leader of the House, whether time will be allocated for a substantive debate on defence procurement reform in this session, in the context of the continued non-publication of the Defence Investment Plan and the architectural questions raised by the Strategic Defence Review.

C.7 Lines for Committee Inquiry

Framed as hearing lines for use by clerks and Members in planning evidence sessions.

Comparative institutional architecture of Ukrainian, European, and UK defence-technology procurement. Witnesses: National Armaments Director; Director of UK Defence Innovation; Chief Executive of Helsing UK; Ukrainian Ambassador to the UK or head of Brave1 via video link; academic witnesses from RUSI, IISS, and Chatham House.
The evidence basis for the Defence Investment Plan's continued delay. Witnesses: Permanent Secretary of the MoD; Second Permanent Secretary; Chief of the Defence Staff; NAO officials.
The operating model of Project ASGARD and its prospects for generalisation. Witnesses: senior responsible owner for ASGARD; consortium representatives (Helsing, Anduril, Modini, Threod); Director of DE&S.
Workforce and institutional implications of a defence-technology cluster outside standard civil service frameworks. Witnesses: Cabinet Secretary; Chief Executive of UK Research and Innovation; former GDS leadership from the 2011–2015 configuration.

The purpose of such inquiries is not to produce hostile findings but to constitute the public record against which subsequent ministerial decisions can be assessed, and to create the institutional pressure within which those decisions are more likely to be taken with the architectural clarity this paper recommends.